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ABSTRACT 
Accompanying the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) emergence as a global economic 
and diplomatic power has been the concurrent phenomenon of its rapid military 
modernization.  This confluence has engendered policy concerns stemming from the 
notion that if the PRC continues with its current trend of military modernization its 
regional military influence could at some point potentially rival or surpass that of the 
United States.  This has spawned myriad literature that confronts the subject of the PRC’s 
military modernization.   
General consensus indicates that the reintegration of Taiwan and countering 
United States intervention in such a conflict functions as a primary driver behind the 
PRC’s recent military modernization.  There is also a modicum of consensus that the 
PRC’s burgeoning global stature has prompted the PLA to also pursue power-projection 
type endeavors such as sea line of communication (SLOC) defense and protection.  Due 
to the intrinsic value of naval forces toward these goals, the PLAN functions as a 
sufficient microcosm through which to identify broad PLA intentions.  This thesis 
objectively surveys the PLAN’s modernization in order to determine the extent of the 
balance between the PRC’s military problem sets of Taiwan and SLOC protection as 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The last three decades witnessed the emergence of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) as a global economic and diplomatic power.  This emergence has also been 
accompanied by rapid military modernization.  This confluence has engendered United 
States policy concerns stemming from the notion that, if the PRC continues with its 
current trend of military modernization, its regional military influence could at some 
point potentially rival or surpass that of the United States.  This element of the theory has 
spawned myriad scholarship work and policy reports that confront the subject of the 
modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).   
Contemporary policy work and scholarship analyzing the PLA’s modernization 
have yielded a general consensus on the core premise that “the PLA is developing the 
capability to deter Taiwan independence or influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on 
Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay or deny any possible 
United States support for the island in case of conflict.”1  There is also a modicum of 
consensus that the PRC’s burgeoning diplomatic and economic stature has prompted the 
PLA to also pursue additional power projection type goals such as defending the PRC’s 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs).  Due to the intrinsic value of naval forces for these 
goals, the PLAN functions as a sufficient microcosm through which to identify broad 
PLA intentions and goals. 
The goal of this thesis is to assess this presumed dynamic.  This thesis surveys the 
PLAN’s development and modernization in order to assess the balance between the 
PRC’s military problem sets of Taiwan and SLOC protection as impetus for the PLAN’s 
modern mission paradigm.  
                                                 
1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China, 2010  (Washington, D.C. 2010), I.  
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B. IMPORTANCE 
Responsible analysis of the PLAN first requires acknowledgement of the fact that 
in the last decade the PLAN has been subject to significant modernization efforts 
encompassing upgrades to its materiel, personnel and training establishments. These 
efforts have provoked significant speculative explanations as to the reasons for, as well as 
the goals and implications of the PLAN’s recent modernization.   
Pursuant to this, the priority modernization of the PLAN has attracted the 
attention of the United States military and has been captured in several recent United 
States Department of Defense, congressional and intelligence publications that focus on 
the development and status of the PLAN.2  Furthermore, assessments of the PLAN’s 
modernization have been influential in altering United States military strategy writ large.  
As Robert Kaplan observes, “the U.S. Navy’s new maritime strategy, unveiled in October 
2007…both states and implies that the (U.S.) Navy will henceforth seek a sustained, 
forward presence in the…western Pacific, but less so in the Atlantic.”3  Increasingly, 
recent scholarly and policy work ascribes the Chinese naval modernization effort to the 
PRC’s primary politico-military problem set of Taiwan and the PRC’s growing attention 
on SLOC defense.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Central to the PRC’s military problem sets of Taiwan and SLOC defense are 
broader political themes regarding the PRC—the most overarching of which is the 
perpetuation of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) absolute authority. This notion is 
particularly applicable to the Taiwan issue as it is generally asserted that Taiwan’s 
                                                 
2 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China, 2010  (Washington, D.C. 2010).  Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: 
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research 
Service, RL33153 (April 2011).  Office of Naval Intelligence, “The People’s Liberation Army-Navy: A 
Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,” Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009   
http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/docs/china_army_navy.pdf (accessed July, 14, 2011).   
3 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: 
Random House, 2010), 9.   
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independence is intrinsically tied to the CCP’s legitimacy vis-à-vis the PRC populace.4  
The implication of this argument, Susan Shirk argues, is that “if China’s leaders believe 
the regime’s survival is at stake, they would feel compelled to react militarily to an 
independence referendum.”5  Further compounding the Taiwan issue from a politico-
military standpoint is the precedent set by the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, during 
which the United States dispatched multiple aircraft carrier strike groups to the area.   As 
a result, the influence of the Taiwan issue functions as a significant factor toward 
effective analysis of the PLAN’s contemporary trajectory.        
The pervasive specter of CCP demise is also pertinent to the notion that the PLAN 
is pursuing power projection capability because of Beijing’s aspirations of SLOC 
security.  This derives from the judgment, as Aaron Friedberg argues, that the PRC: 
Economic engine is now so large…that it requires vast and expanding 
volumes of energy, minerals and agricultural raw materials to keep it 
going (and) an increasing fraction of what China requires to maintain 
forward momentum must be brought in from beyond the PRC’s borders.6   
This dynamic has engendered the speculation that “ensuring a regular flow of energy 
imports into China will increasingly become the responsibility of the Chinese military 
(thus) the PLAN may increasingly feel the need to patrol the (PRC’s) SLOCs.”7  In a 
similar vein as the Taiwan issue, “the CCP’s (consideration of) rapid economic growth 
(as a) political imperative”8 has influential reverberations in PRC security policy—
specifically as it applies to the modern PLAN.   
Ultimately, this thesis argues that the threat of United States intervention in a 
Taiwan conflict is the main driver of the PLAN’s modernization.  To bolster this 
argument, this thesis asserts that Taiwan is the most exigent politico-military threat to the 
                                                 
4 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.   
5 Ibid., 182.   
6 Aaron Friedberg, “Going Out: China’s Pursuit of Natural Resources and Implications for the PRC’s 
Grand Strategy,” NBR Analysis 17, no. 3 (September 2006):  7.   
7 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress,” in 
Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael 
Wills (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 77.   
8 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower , 54.   
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CCP and that within this paradigm the PLA has identified the United States military as 
the most significant obstacle regarding Taiwan’s re-integration.  This thesis indicates that 
the PLAN’s recent force development reinforces the PLAN’s primary focus on the 
United States within the framework of a Taiwan conflict.  Furthermore, in consideration 
of historic and current trends, this thesis argues that the PLAN’s SLOC power projection 
designs are limited and does not function as a significant force shaping priority.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As previously indicated, the PLAN’s modernization has stimulated a significant 
body of scholarship and policy work.  Contemporary work on the PLAN is 
complemented by large literature that addresses the broader related topics of PRC energy 
concerns, security, and domestic and foreign policy.  Consideration of the PLAN as it 
pertains to the Taiwan and SLOC power projection paradigms requires division of the 
relevant literature into three broad categories:  PRC strategy and policy, the PLA writ 
large, and evaluations of the PLAN.  Within these broad categories are multiple sub-
categories—all of which have some degree of bearing regarding consideration of the 
PLAN’s modernization model.  
Review of the broad category of PRC strategy and policy in the context of the 
research question yields two pertinent sub-categorical divisions.  The first entails a 
general survey of the contemporary PRC.  Dominating this sub-category is Susan Shirk’s 
China: Fragile Superpower—in which she outlines via thorough analysis of PRC-related 
phenomena9 the overarching domestic political backdrop: “the weak legitimacy of the 
(CCP) and its leaders’ sense of vulnerability.”10  Rounding out this sub-category is 
another survey work: Marc Lanteigne’s Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction.11  
Though lacking significant analytical depth, Lanteigne’s treatment outlines the broad-
strokes of PRC foreign policy via consideration of the PRC’s position within the global 
                                                 
9 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 1–320. 
10 Ibid., 255.   
11 Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2009).   
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economic dynamic, the role of the PLA, and regional/ United States relations.12  Both 
Shirk and Lanteigne’s works provide a foundation for research as they delineate the 
broader fundamentals of the PRC’s contemporary domestic and foreign policy 
dynamics—both of which are significant factors regarding detailed analysis of the PLA 
and more specifically, the PLAN.   
The other sub-category of PRC strategy and policy deals with PRC machinations 
vis-à-vis its burgeoning energy concerns.  Christopher J. Pehrson’s 2006 article “String 
of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power across the Asian Littoral” 
provides a clear definition for what is widely considered the PRC’s practical application 
for addressing the vulnerability of its SLOC dependence:  
The ‘String of Pearls’…(as) each ‘pearl’…is a nexus of Chinese 
geopolitical influence or military presence (and they) extend from the 
coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the 
Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the 
Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.13   
Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins offer further insight by outlining and 
assessing the overall efficacy of the PRC’s overland pipeline endeavors.14  Finally, a 
recent article by Christina Lin provides an updated and comprehensive evaluation of the 
PRC’s approach to its energy quandary.15   
Consideration of the PLA writ large also breaks down into two sub-categories: the 
PLA in a historical context, and comprehensive force assessments.  The survey approach 
dominates the literature on the PLA in its historical context, from its founding to the 
present.  John Gittings’ The Role of the Chinese Army offers an insightful assessment of 
the early decades of the PLA, analyzing the strategy, action and modernization efforts of 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 1–153.   
13 Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power across the 
Asian Littoral,” Strategic Studies Institute (July 2006), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=721 (accessed July 26, 2011), 3. 
14 Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream: The Reality, and 
Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 89–
111.   
15 Christina Lin, “The New Silk Road: China’s Energy Strategy in the Greater Middle East,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Focus #109, (April 2011), 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus109.pdf (accessed July 27, 2011).    
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the PLA from the Civil War through the first 15 years of the PRC’s existence.16  Ellis 
Joffe’s The Chinese Army after Mao traces the evolution of the PLA—against the 
backdrop of Mao’s precedent—over the decade that follows his death.17  Nan Li provides 
an adequate interpretation of PLA development through the mid-1990s,18 highlighting 
“how (the modern) doctrine of ‘limited war under high technology conditions’ (was) 
formulated.”19  Gerald Segal’s Defending China offers a more case-based approach to the 
PLA by analyzing the PLA’s major conflicts from 1949 through 1979.20  Finally, Paul 
H.B. Godwin21 and Thomas Christensen22 use broad empirical analysis in the 
contemporary context to formulate evaluations of the PLA in the recent period.   
Comprehensive PLA force assessments comprise the other major sub-category of 
broad PLA evaluation literature.  Scope and analysis vary within this sub-category.  
Dennis J. Blasko’s The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st 
Century focuses primarily on the ground forces,23 while authors like David Shambaugh24 
and Richard D. Fisher, Jr.25 offer broader, more encompassing evaluations. In 2011, the 
United States Office of the Secretary of Defense issued its annual report to congress 
which offers the Pentagon’s most authoritative and comprehensive public assessment of 
                                                 
16 John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).   
17 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1987).   
18 Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–95: A Chinese 
Perspective,” The China Quarterly no. 146, Special Issue: China’s Military in Transition (June 1996), 443–
463.   
19 Ibid., 458.   
20 Gerald Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).   
21 Paul H.B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949–1999,” in Chinese 
Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, eds. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. 
McDevitt (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 23–55.   
22 Thomas J. Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,” in New 
Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, eds. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 50–85.   
23 Dennis J. Blasko,  The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century 
(New York: Routledge, 2006).   
24 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (California: 
University of California Press, 2002).   
25 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008).    
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the PLA.26  Previous iterations of this report also provide relevant insight.27  Also in 
2011, the PRC released its annual national defense white paper which functions as its 
primary foreign policy communique regarding the status and bearing of the PLA.28  
Collectively, the works within this sub-category provide the baseline from which to 
analyze the PLA and the PLAN.   
The literature dedicated to PRC sea power and the PLAN dominates the third 
broad category in this review.  Like the other two broader literature categories, the PLAN 
category can also be broken into three sub-categories:  PLAN force assessments, PRC 
maritime strategy assessments, and PLAN power projection.  Three core works offer 
PLAN force assessment.   First, the Office of Naval Intelligence’s (ONI) 2009 
publication The People’s Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics provides a comprehensive survey of the PLAN, including command and 
control, materiel, personnel and training.29  The second edition of Bernard D. Cole’s The 
Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century also surveys the PLAN in a 
similar manner as the ONI report, but Cole expands further upon contextual factors that 
have shaped the PLAN.30  Finally, Ronald O’Rourke’s regularly updated Congressional 
Research Service report on the PLAN provides a synopsis of its recent modernization.31 
Additional work within the sub-category of PLAN force assessments is more 
specialized—focusing primarily on particular components of the PLAN.   Andrew S. 
                                                 
26 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China, 2011 (Washington, D.C. 2011).    
27 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China, 2010 (Washington, D.C. 2010).   Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2007 (Washington, D.C. 2007).      
28 The People’s Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense 
in 2010, (March 2011) , http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011–03/31/c_13806851.htm  
(accessed September 21, 2011).   
29 Office of Naval Intelligence, “The People’s Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009   
http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/docs/china_army_navy.pdf (accessed July, 14, 2011).   
30 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed.  
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2010).   
31Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-
Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, RL33153 (April 2011).  
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Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray and Andrew R. Wilson’s edited essay 
collection China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force32 offers what Scott W. Bray’s 
review of the book describes as “important aspects of China’s submarine force that 
explain the rationale for Beijing’s large submarine investment.”33  Nan Li and 
Christopher Weuve discuss the “major changes in the…conditions that are necessary and 
would be largely sufficient for China to acquire aircraft carriers.”34  In the book A War 
Like No Other: The Truth about China’s Challenge to America,35 authors Richard C. 
Bush and Michael E. O’Hanlon assess the PLAN’s amphibious forces, particularly in the 
context of Taiwan.36  Daniel J. Kostecka offers analysis on “how China will seek to 
employ its aircraft carriers and modern amphibious assault ships.”37 Capping this sub-
category, Vitaliy O. Pradun evaluates PLAN missile capabilities, especially with regard 
to “(PLAN procurement) over the past decade…of ASCMs (Anti-Ship Cruise 
Missiles).”38  
With regard to assessments of PRC maritime strategy, Paul An-hao Huang’s work 
The Maritime Strategy of China in the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, Development and 
Impact is a comprehensive analysis of PRC maritime strategy primarily in the context of 
defense and security.39  Thomas M. Kane’s  Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime 
Power  takes a similar approach, although it brings to bear in greater measure Chinese 
                                                 
32 Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray and Andrew R. Wilson, eds., China’s 
Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2007).   
33 Scott W. Bray, “Turning to the Sea…This Time to Stay,” Asia Policy, no. 9 (January 2010): 168.   
34 Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update,” Naval War 
College Review 63, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 13, 13–31.     
35 Richard C. Bush and Michael E. O’Hanlon, A War Like No Other: The Truth about China’s 
Challenge to America (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007).   
36 Ibid., 187–195.   
37 Daniel J. Kostecka, “PLA Doctrine and the Employment of Sea-Based Airpower,” Naval War 
College Review 64, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 27, 11–30.   
38 Vitaliy O. Pradun, “From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts: China’s Missile Revolution and PLA 
Strategy Against U.S. Military Intervention,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 2 (Spring 2011):12, 7–38.   
39 Paul An-hao Huang, The Maritime Strategy of China in the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, 
Development and Impact (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010).   
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history and the global impact of PRC maritime strategy.40  James R. Holmes and Toshi 
Yoshihara’s work Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan41 
considers PRC maritime strategy through the prism of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of 
“sea power (which) was not strictly equivalent to naval power…(rather) defined… 
variously in economic and military terms.”42  Holmes and Yoshihara build upon this in 
their later work Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. 
Maritime Strategy, “(contending) that China’s access-denial strategy is only one facet of 
a broader, more sustained Chinese nautical challenge to the United States.”43  Rounding 
out this sub-category is Andrew S.  Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord’s edited 
collection of work offering a comparative evaluation of the PRC’s maritime strategy in 
China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective.44     
With regard to power projection, Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. 
Goldstein and William S. Murray’s edited essay collection China’s Energy Strategy: The 
Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies45 collectively articulates a dominant theme—“the 
issue of an interconnection between Chinese energy and naval strategies.”46  Jonathan 
Holslag also assesses this theme.47  Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein’s article 
Gunboats for China’s New ‘Grand Canals’? Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval 
and Oil Security Policies approaches the same theme, but expands on it by “(discussing) 
PLA doctrinal writings relevant to SLOC protection missions (and offering) potential 
                                                 
40 Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2002).   
41 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to 
Mahan (New York: Routledge, 2008).   
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leading indicators of Chinese development of a navy capable of long-range SLOC 
protection.”48 The capstone work within this sub-category—Christopher D. Yung and 
Ross Rustici with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman’s China’s Out of Area Naval 
Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and Potential Solutions deploys an 
index-based approach using other nations’ historical data as a framework for assessing 
observed PLAN out of area behavior.49  
Broadly, the literature reviewed here reinforces the notion that Taiwan and SLOC 
protection are foremost priorities of the PLA and PLAN.  Within this paradigm, the 
general consensus is that the exigencies of the Taiwan issue dominate the PLAN’s 
strategic planning and resultant modernization.  However, this literature also generally 
posits that due to the emerging relevance of PRC SLOC protection the PLAN has also 
embarked on nascent power-projection capabilities pursuant to that mission.  This thesis 
will argue that Taiwan is the primary impetus behind the PLAN’s modernization but 
challenge the general assertion that it has significant power-projection designs predicated 
on SLOC protection. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK 
The goal of this thesis is to determine the extent to which the PRC’s presumptive 
military missions of Taiwan and SLOC protection are driving the PLAN’s modernization.  
The methodological approach to this largely corresponds to the broad categorical and 
sub-categorical themes outlined in the literature review.  Due to the fact that pertinent 
literature is an amalgamation of historical surveys, comparative analyses and case study-
type approaches, the resultant analytical tactic for this thesis is a hybrid of historical and 
case study methods.  This unique approach demands a two-pronged strategy.   
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Primarily drawing from work outlined in the PRC strategy and policy and PLA 
writ large literature review categories, the first prong relies heavily on historical analysis 
to identify and assign observed trend lines to the PLA, the PLAN as its microcosm and 
PRC threat perceptions.    With respect to trend analysis of the PLA and PLAN, sourcing 
largely draws from the previously outlined historical interpretations of John Gittings, 
Ellis Joffe, Nan Li and Gerald Segal as the collective of these works is sufficient in both 
historical and analytical breadth to gauge an accurate overarching assessment of the 
PLA.50  Supplementary sources to this broad PLA analysis vis-à-vis the PLAN primarily 
draw on Thomas M. Kane’s, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara’s works relating to 
PRC maritime strategy,51 and Bernard Cole’s historical contextualization.52  Sourcing for 
this thesis’s assessment of PRC threat perceptions also draws on these historical surveys 
but is also augmented by politically-focused works such as those authored by Susan Shirk 
and Marc Lanteigne.53  Work which focuses on potential PRC politico-military issues 
pertinent to power projection and SLOC defense such as those by Robert Kaplan, 
Christopher Pehrson, and Christina Lin also inform this assessment.54   The intended 
yield of this approach is to properly couch the military problem sets of Taiwan and SLOC 
power projection in relation to current PRC threat perceptions and correspondent 
employment of the PLAN.        
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Against this backdrop, the second prong relies significantly upon literature 
outlined in the broad PLAN category and uses a disciplined case study tack to analyze the 
current doctrine, personnel and equipment of the modern PLAN.  As a result, sourcing 
for this element of this thesis draws primarily from unclassified United States intelligence 
and government publications such as the comprehensive PLA/PLAN assessments 
published by ONI, the Congressional Research Service and the Pentagon.55   These 
broader sources are supplemented by more specific analytical pieces such as those in the 
three essay collections China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, China’s Energy 
Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies and China Goes to Sea: Maritime 
Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective56 as well as past Naval War 
College Review publications.57  The intended output of the second prong is a clear, data-
based assessment of the direction of the PLAN’s current mission model vis-à-vis Taiwan 
or SLOC protection.   
Based on the methodology outlined above, this thesis is organized into three more 
chapters.  The next chapter presents a brief historical survey of the PLA—and the PLAN 
as its subordinate service—since PRC’s inception in 1949, which identifies contextual 
threat-based trends and characteristics.  The second chapter also includes a comparative 
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analysis of the Taiwan and SLOC protection security paradigms to identify which of the 
two models poses the greatest threat to the PRC.  Against this backdrop, the third chapter 
outlines an elemental analysis of the PLAN’s modernization to include sections devoted 
to equipment, personnel, training and operations.  The concluding chapter assimilates the 
analytical conclusions of Chapters II and III to construct this thesis’ final argument as to 
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II. THE PRC SECURITY CONTEXT 
This chapter is comprised of two sections.   The first section offers a survey of the 
PLA since 1949.  This section also includes a sub-section dedicated to the PLAN’s 
observed historical behavior and evolution as the PLA’s subordinate service.  The second 
section analyzes and contrasts Taiwan and SLOC protection as contemporary PRC 
security problem sets.  These analyses conclude that 1) the PLA writ large—and the 
PLAN as its subordinate—has historically been and continues to be defensively focused 
and oriented toward the prevalent threat to PRC territorial sovereignty and 2) this 
paradigm, though nuanced, remains applicable in the PRC’s contemporary politico-
military climate as the threat of the United States in a Taiwan re-integration conflict 
functions as the main impetus behind the PLA’s—and by extension PLAN’s—
modernization.    
A. THE PLA SINCE 1949 
Within the contemporary global order, the PRC’s development as a diplomatic 
and economic force is happening alongside its rapid military modernization.  This 
dynamic serves as the framework for the increasingly pervasive “China threat theory 
(which) maintains that China will use its burgeoning power to destabilize regional 
security.”58  From a historical perspective, this theory is not without precedent but “all of 
the PLA’s military contingencies since 1949 have been local, limited wars (as) all have 
been fought on or extremely close to China’s land borders.”59  This is a direct result of 
the fact that the PLA has historically been oriented toward the PRC’s “strategic objective 
(of) defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”60  The PRC itself maintains 
this theme as its most recent white paper articulates that “following the founding of the  
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New China in 1949, the PLA set a general guideline and objective of building 
outstanding, modernized and revolutionary armed forces...for the purpose of self-
defense.”61   
There is a modicum of scholarly work that opposes the premise that there is a 
definitive pattern outlining the PRC’s historical use of force.   Gerald Segal argues flatly 
“that in the main no such consistency or logic really exists.”62  Thomas J. Christensen 
echoes this sentiment with his nuanced, context-dependent argument that the PRC 
historically employs “the use of force...as (either) a solution to a security problem (or) as 
a method of shaping longer-term international security trends (and) most frequently when 
it perceived an opening window of vulnerability or a closing window of opportunity.”63  
Christensen also invokes the importance of “political trends in China’s own alliances and 
in the alliances formed among China’s actual or potential enemies.”64  To be sure, every 
instance of PRC use of force since 1949 has certain unique contextual elements that 
contributed to the PRC’s military course of action.  This chapter does not contest that 
point.  This chapter argues that the PRC’s historical use of force was always undertaken 
within the overarching framework of the defense of territorial sovereignty.     
To bolster this argument, this chapter outlines a comprehensive survey of PLA 
guidance and doctrine since 1949.  This analysis will indicate that PLA doctrine is 
primarily defensively centered and oriented toward the prevalent threat to PRC territory 
and territorial claims.  The chapter will then take a hybrid case-study/survey approach 
toward the historical employment of the PRC’s use of force since 1949 by analyzing the 
PRC’s conflicts with Korea, India, the Soviet Union, and with Vietnam in 1979.  
Included in this evaluation will be a section dedicated to the PLAN that will identify its 
role as a complementary service within the broader PRC security apparatus.  This will  
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indicate that the common thread regarding PRC use of force is that it is primarily 
defensive and used in response to threats to or actual infringements upon PRC territorial 
sovereignty. 
1. PLA Doctrine: Playing Defense 
Within the PRC’s political construct, the PLA functions as a subservient element 
to the CCP.65  This dynamic was manifest early on “when the Chinese Communists came 
to power in 1949, (as) one of their most urgent tasks was to convert their victorious but 
primitive army into an armed force capable of defending China from external enemies.”66  
Hence, The PRC’s infancy required the adoption of a primarily defensive strategy and the 
direct result was the adoption of the doctrine known as active defense.67     
Enduring until today, the principle of active defense functions as the overarching 
doctrinal guidance for the PLA.68  The core dictum of active defense is that it “posits a 
defensive military strategy in which China does not initiate wars or fight wars of 
aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”69  Taken at face value, the principle of active defense can be interpreted as 
solely defensive and retaliatory in nature; active defense’s underlying intent, however, 
advocates the “conduct (of) offensive operations within a defensive strategy.”70  Further 
complicating this overarching guidance are PRC assertions that enemy attack could also 
assume extra-military form, particularly in the political realm.71  Subsequent analysis will  
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indicate that non-kinetic and political factors have played a role in the practical 
application of active defense.  However, this dynamic has never obviated active defense’s 
core doctrinal mandate.  
Ellis Joffe maintains that the fundamental “function of a military doctrine is to 
provide guidelines for the conduct of a war the armed forces are most likely to wage—
not to take account of any conflict that can be subsumed under the rubric of total war.”72  
PLA doctrine since 1949 reflects this premise while simultaneously maintaining 
adherence to active defense.  The initial “foundation of China’s military thinking was 
based upon Mao’s...concept of people’s war.”73  People’s war dominated PLA doctrine 
during Mao’s leadership tenure and for the brief interregnum following his death in 1976.  
During this period, the concept of people’s war was largely shaped by the prevalent 
existential threat from the neighboring and militarily superior Soviet Union.  In this 
context, people’s war doctrine dictated that “the PLA would compensate for its 
technological inferiority with its abundant space, manpower, and time by ‘luring the 
enemy in deep’ and staying mobile.” 74 Ultimately, “this would allow China to gradually 
weaken the overextended invading forces, identify their weaknesses, reconstitute the 
resistance forces, and finally win the war through more decisive, strategic offensives.”75  
The basis for this initial articulation and iteration of PLA doctrine in the post-1949 era 
was singularly defense of the PRC’s homeland.   
In the wake of Mao’s death, it became apparent that people’s war would no longer 
suffice as the PLA’s main functional doctrine due to global technological and logistic 
advancements in warfare.  As a result, the late 1970s bore witness to an upgraded version 
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of people’s war known as people’s war under modern conditions.76  This upgrade was 
significant because “the PLA’s operational doctrine and strategies (underwent) 
modifications even though the assumption of a Soviet invasion of China had not 
changed.”77  This new doctrine continued to be based on a primarily defensive strategy 
but offered a key variation in that “rather than fighting a classic ‘people’s war’ by 
drawing enemy forces into the interior of China, under ‘people’s war under modern 
conditions’ the PLA now sought to defeat the adversary close to the border.”78  Though 
upgraded, this doctrinal shift continued to reflect the PLA’s homeland defense- based 
core mission set.   
A marked sea change in PLA doctrine shift came about in 1985 under the 
direction of the CCP’s Central Military Commission.  This shift was largely due to the 
PRC leadership’s reassessment of the prevalent regional security threat, in that by 1985 
the threat of a massive Soviet invasion had abated and it was assumed that future conflict 
would be concentrated on “local, limited war around China’s periphery.”79  Though the 
advent of the local war doctrine represented a departure from previous doctrinal 
strategies, it remained fundamentally defensively oriented in that “local war was 
envisioned as a short, mid- to high- intensity conflict on China’s borders or not far from 
the border region.”80 
The next steps in the PLA’s doctrinal evolution were born largely in reaction to 
“the Gulf War (whereas) following that war, China’s military strategists placed even 
greater emphasis on technology, modifying their depiction of future conflict from limited 
war to ‘limited war under high-tech conditions’.”81  The most recent PLA doctrinal 
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change has manifested as “‘local war under conditions of informationalization’ in the 
early twenty-first century.”82  The common strand throughout the PLA’s doctrinal 
evolution since 1945 has been that all iterations are defensively based.  The concept of 
defense has remained constant despite doctrinal adaptations to the prevalent threat or 
changing nature of conflict.  This reinforces the notion that the PLA is and remains 
focused on the prevalent threat to the PRC’s territorial sovereignty. The following 
historical survey of PLA behavior since 1949 will indicate that in practical application 
the PRC invokes the use force in a manner consistent with its defense-centric doctrinal 
principles. 
a. Korea 1950–1953: Active Defense in Practice     
In the autumn of 1950, volunteer PLA soldiers crossed the Yalu River in 
support of North Korea marking the PRC’s entrance into the Korean War, a war “in the 
initiation of which the Chinese took no part, and in the waging of which they had no 
intention of participating.”83  Still reeling from a protracted civil war, in those early days 
the nascent PRC was primarily focused internally and external military focus revolved 
largely on Taiwan.  Regarding Korea, the PRC ostensibly supported their communist 
neighbor in a moral sense, yet not enough to dedicate resources that would require 
neglect of its fundamental internal focus.84  Yet, the advancement of UN and U.S. troops 
into North Korea threatened the embryonic nation and prompted the PRC “to enter the 
Korean War reluctantly...because of the perceived long term threat that would be posed 
by the permanent stationing of U.S. forces in North Korea.”85   
This dynamic forced the PLA to outline a military plan for Korea that 
would fundamentally defend the PRC from United States invasion and attack.  Pursuant 
to this, the PLA was able to achieve early success and penetrate Seoul in early January 
1951.  Eventually United States forces were able to repel the PLA advance to the 38th 
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parallel where both sides remained entrenched until the June 1953 armistice. The PRC’s 
intervention in Korea is significant because it is a definitive instance of the practical 
application of the PLA’s core directive of active defense.86  This was manifest when the 
PRC “intentionally took on a superior foe out of fear that (its) enemy’s superiority would 
only grow, and the PRC’s security would be further compromised if action were not 
taken.”87  As a result, the PLA’s experience in Korea serves as an initial data point 
indicative of an enduring trend regarding the PRC’s limited and defensively based use of 
force. 
b. India 1962: Setting a Precedent 
Analysis of the PRC’s border conflict with India in 1962 indicates that it is 
clear the PRC engaged in kinetic warfare in the pursuit of defensive ends.  This is 
because “Chinese objectives in the Sino-Indian War (were) overwhelmingly based on a 
perceived vulnerability to Indian territorial encroachments.”88  Providing backdrop to the 
conflict was the existential fact that in the early 1960s there was residual Sino-Indian 
tension regarding longstanding border disputes   Exacerbating this festering problem set 
was India’s 1961 discovery of a PRC-constructed road connecting Xinjiang to Tibet in 
the disputed Aksai Chin region.  Following this discovery, from late 1961 until the fall of 
1962, both nations conducted probe-like military maneuvers in the region while 
simultaneously engaging in superficial diplomatic theater.89  The crisis culminated when 
“the PLA conducted two offensive campaigns, and in late November (1962) Beijing 
declared a unilateral ceasefire and drew back to the territory it had controlled before the 
outbreak of hostilities.”90   
The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 set a distinct precedent in that: 
China’s use of force was...clearly more defensive and political than it was 
rooted in a desire to expand Chinese territory, because China quickly and 
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unilaterally ceded much of the territory that the PLA gained in its utter 
rout of Indian forces on the latter’s side of the Sino-Indian border’s line of 
control.91   
As a result, the Sino-Indian conflict functions as a touchstone case of defensively 
oriented non-expansionist PRC military behavior.   
c. Russia 1969: The Trend Continues   
The PRC-Soviet relationship of the early-to-mid 1950s was largely 
amicable in that it could be effectively described as a semi-symbiotic relationship 
highlighted by a shared ideology and a 1950 defense treaty.  However, the bi-lateral 
dynamic began to deteriorate in the late 1950s largely due to the concert of Khruschev’s 
de-Stalinization campaign, the subsequent Soviet withdrawal of aid and the PRC’s 
increasing discontent with legacy treaties and their attendant border demarcations.   By 
1969 as both armies had garrisoned hundreds of thousands of troops along the disputed 
border regions.92   
The PRC’s threat perception of the Soviet Union escalated as a result of 
the Soviet Union’s 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev’s concurrent proclamation of his signature doctrine indicating the Soviet 
Union’s “prerogative to intervene in ‘socialist’ states to defend socialism from either 
domestic or foreign threats.”93  This dynamic sparked a March 1969 PLA assault of 
Soviet forces in the disputed border region followed by a brief conflict on Zhenbaodao 
(Damansky) Island on the Ussuri River.  At the time of this conflict, the concert of a 
deteriorating bi-lateral relationship and the decade-long build-up of Soviet forces were 
probably interpreted by the PRC as “the precursor of an eventual Soviet attack."94   
Therefore, by initiating kinetic action in its tenuous border region the PRC was ultimately 
keeping with its overarching defensively based military posture.    
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d. Vietnam 1979: Same Story, Different Decade  
The PRC’s invasion of “Vietnam in 1979 was the sole major combat 
operation in the 1970’s and remains the last significant PLA operational experience.”95  
For the PRC, the regional threat environment of the late 1970s had solidified around the 
Soviet Union to the north and Vietnam to the south.  This dynamic was exacerbated in 
during the 1977-78 Cambodia-Vietnam conflict which resulted in the PRC’s siding with 
Cambodia. The situation escalated in late December 1978 as a result of Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia. In response, “on 17 February 1979...the PLA initiated a ‘self-
defense counterattack’ to ‘teach Vietnam a lesson’ (and by) mid-March, Beijing 
announced it had achieved the objectives of its ‘punitive’ invasion and withdrew PLA 
forces back to China.”96  
PRC use of force in Vietnam was predicated upon checking Vietnam’s 
regional aggression.  The most tangible element of this objective was the obvious 
deterrent factor the PRC’s invasion of Vietnam would have in preventing any Vietnamese 
invasion of PRC proper.   More abstractly, this objective was in line with the broader 
regional security context facing the PRC in that “by attacking Moscow’s key Asian 
ally...(and) attempting to raise the cost of Vietnam’s Cambodian adventure and perhaps 
save (Cambodian leader) Pol Pot...Beijing could hope to prove its own mettle and cast 
doubt on the meaning of Soviet power.”97  Though the tactical success of the invasion 
was questionable, Vietnamese forces never seriously threatened PRC territory.98 
Additionally, the PRC’s swift withdrawal is also consistent with its previous, non-
expansionist behavior and reinforces its defensively-based military proclivities.  In 
keeping with its defense-centric trend, the Vietnamese experience in 1979 functions as  
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the last kinetic instance “since 1949, (that) the PLA...successfully deterred surrounding 
powers from invading China proper, fighting in China proper, or engaging in hostilities 
too near the Chinese periphery.”99 
2. The PLAN within the PLA’s Defense Paradigm 
Since 1949, the PLAN has functioned as a complementary subordinate within the 
overarching, defensively-based mission profile of the PLA. The PLAN was officially 
established in May 1950 and throughout the 1950s the nascent PLAN’s core charge was 
to oppose the naval threat emanating from Taiwan.100  This dynamic was complicated by 
the eventual concert of “the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the 
military’s budgetary focus on aircraft and nuclear weapons, and the loss of technical 
assistance from the Soviet Union following the Sino-Soviet split.”101  This confluence 
besought adverse developmental effects on the PLAN that characterized its existence 
until its recent modernization.        
The PLAN’s initial doctrinal charge was known as coastal defense, a strategy that 
dovetailed with the prevalent Soviet threat-based PLA doctrine of people’s war in that 
coastal defense “focused the PLAN on defending China’s coast from the Soviet Pacific 
Fleet as a small component of what would primarily be a land war.”102  By the early 
1980s, PLAN leader Admiral Liu Huaqing advocated a doctrinal shift toward a strategy 
of offshore defense. The PLAN’s eventual adoption of this doctrinal shift “paralleled the 
CMC’s adoption of a new military strategy that focused on local wars on China’s 
periphery instead of one based on a major...confrontation with the Soviet Union.”103  
Admiral Liu’s change promoted the limited expansion of the PLAN’s defensive 
perimeter to the first island chain, roughly delineated as the Kurile Islands, Japan, Taiwan 
and the Phillippines. Liu’s broadly defined offshore defense doctrine continues to 
                                                 
99 Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, “Introduction: Patterns of PLA Warfighting,” 19.   
100 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 7–8.   
101 Office of Naval Intelligence, “The People’s Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” 4.   
102 Ibid,. 5.   
103 Ibid., 6.   
 25
function as the core doctrinal guidance for the PLAN.104  However, the advent and 
influence of the broader PLA doctrine of “‘local wars under modern high-tech 
conditions’ (has) many Chinese scholars and PLAN strategists now (advocating) a new 
strategy for the 21st century termed ‘distant sea defense’ (which does) not bound 
operations geographically, but rather...according to China’s maritime needs.”105       
The evolution of PLAN doctrine is consistent with the broader, defensively-
oriented evolution of PLA doctrine writ large.  Also consistent with broader PLA 
employment is the fact that the PRC “has not hesitated to employ naval force in pursuit of 
national security goals (and) typically has employed naval force over issues of 
sovereignty concerning specific islands and provinces.”106  As an illustration of this 
dynamic, the 1974 Xisha (Paracel) Islands conflict functions as a key exemplar of the 
PLAN’s complementary mission within the broader defensively-based machinations of 
the PLA.    
a. The PLAN in Action: Xisha (Paracel) Islands 1974  
In keeping with its established, territorial sovereignty-defense based 
motivations for its use of force, “(the PRC’s) seizure of the Xisha (Paracel) Islands in 
January 1974 was ostensibly merely a natural reassertion of control over Chinese 
territory.”107  This was due to the fact that the PRC considered the Xisha (Paracel) Islands 
sovereign territory.    The situation reached its climax in January 1974 following several 
months of intensified regional disputes stemming from the South Vietnamese 
government’s 1973 awarding of oil concessions in the region.  Following intermittent 
though intensifying early January skirmishes between PLAN and South Vietnamese 
forces in the Xisha Archipelago, the PLAN was ultimately able to sink Vietnamese naval 
                                                 
104 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 174–178.   
105 Office of Naval Intelligence, “The People’s Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” 6.   
106 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 18.   
107 Segal, Defending China, 197.   
 26
forces and conduct amphibious operations that ultimately resulted in the occupation and 
reinforcement of Jinyin and Shanhu Islands.108 
Although a relatively minor operation, the 1974 Xisha (Paracel) Islands 
conflict functions as a key incident of kinetic PLAN action and as a signature data point 
regarding the PLAN’s role within the PRC’s security apparatus.  In a favorable post-
Vietnam War international context, the PLAN was utilized in a limited manner so as “to 
compel others to accept its definition of Chinese territory.”109  This employment is 
consistent with historical PLA behavior writ large and is indicative of the enduring 
dynamic in which the PLAN functions as a subordinate, complementary and compliant 
module within the broader defensive and territorial sovereignty threat-oriented PRC 
military construct.   
B. THE MODERN SECURITY PARADIGM: SLOC DEFENSE VS. TAIWAN 
As previous sections have articulated, for the bulk of its existence since 1949 the 
PRC’s defensively based military strategies were conceived on major confrontation 
between the PRC and the Soviet Union.  However, this paradigm began to migrate “in 
December 1978 at the Third Plenum meeting of the 11th Central Committee of the 
CCP...(when) Deng Xiaoping formally adopted a shift in national strategy to the 
development of the economy.”110  This shift launched the PRC’s “commitment to 
achieving the ‘Four Modernizations’ of ‘agriculture, industry, science and technology and 
national defense’ (as) a foundation for the (new) period of reform.”111  As a result of 
being “listed last among the ‘Four Modernizations’, the subordination of (the) 
military...to national economic development was a consistent theme (within the PRC) 
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s.”112 The dynamic of a limited regional threat 
environment endures until the present and has been so acknowledged by the PRC in its 
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2010 white paper on national defense in stating that “the Asia-Pacific security situation is 
generally stable.”113  Therefore, the PRC’s contemporary security context is largely 
driven by domestic political and economic concerns.   
Central to this security dynamic is the contemporary CCP’s obsession with 
perpetuating its absolute authority.  This core tenet of CCP survivability pervades the 
PRC’s contemporary security context and is primarily manifest in both economic and 
sovereignty-centric platforms—the most salient of which are the factors of SLOC defense 
and Taiwan respectively.       
As it pertains to the overarching precept of regime survivability, the CCP puts a 
premium on sustaining the PRC’s exponential economic growth.  As a result, the CCP 
figures it must perpetuate economic growth “at an annual rate of 7 percent or more in 
order to create a certain number of jobs and keep unemployment rates at levels that will 
prevent widespread labor unrest (and) these explicit growth...targets remain in the minds 
of all Chinese officials as they create foreign as well as domestic policies.”114  This 
dynamic extends to the PRC’s security realm primarily in the form of sustaining energy 
access as “the country’s oil use and oil import dependence have been rising rapidly since 
China became a net oil importer in 1993.”115   As a result, access to oil resources has 
become critical to the CCP—and by extension PRC—security calculus.  Due to this, the 
PRC’s “SLOCs connecting China to the (oil rich) Middle East and Africa have assumed 
a...vital role as a major ‘center of gravity’ for Chinese economic development.”116  This 
has engendered the prevalent security based assumption that SLOC defense will become 
a significant mission set for the PLAN.  Therefore, in the contemporary context the 
concept of SLOC defense functions as a significant security problem set for the PLA.  
Competing with the PRC’s budding economically-based mission of SLOC 
defense is the more traditional, sovereignty-based security complication that is Taiwan.  
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The issue of Taiwan is intrinsically tied to the omnipresent specter of CCP survivability 
in that “it is widely believed in China and abroad that if the Communist regime allows 
Taiwan to declare formal independence without putting up a fight, the outraged public 
will bring down the regime.”117  Compounding the Taiwan issue is the external factor of 
the United States.  Historical precedent and existential legislation have all but assured 
United States intervention in a Taiwan conflict. Consequently, the convergence of its 
inherent sovereignty-centric importance to CCP survivability and its complicating 
external factor of absolute United States interference makes Taiwan the most exigent 
security issue facing the contemporary PRC.  This dynamic is consistent with the PRC-
PLA’s established defensively oriented and threat based model.  In light of this reality, in 
the PRC’s modern security paradigm SLOC defense functions as a secondary, tangential 
and successive mission to that of Taiwan.              
1. Taiwan: The Center of Gravity 
This chapter’s previous section delineated that the prevalent threat to the PRC’s 
territorial sovereignty has historically driven its existential security calculus.  This 
dynamic, though slightly nuanced, holds in the contemporary context because “the roots 
of the Chinese fixation on Taiwan are purely domestic (and) related to regime 
security.”118  Within this security context, the prevalent threat is functionally political in 
that the Taiwan issue directly impacts CCP survivability.  Thus, for the PRC the Taiwan 
issue is unique because it diverges from past contexts surrounding the PRC’s use of force 
while remaining predicated on its well established premise of the defense of territorial 
sovereignty.    
The fact that Taiwan functions as a nuanced divergence from prior motivations 
for PRC use of force does not dampen its prominence in the PRC’s current security 
landscape.  This is largely due to the fact that the PRC “public cares intensely about 
Taiwan because the CCP has taught it to care—in school textbooks and the media.”119  
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This self-inflicted propagation has both deepened and exacerbated the “connection 
between the Taiwan issue and the survival of Communist Party rule.”120  This significant 
dynamic is compounded by the existential fact that the Taiwan issue is also subject to the 
amplifying specter of the United States.  The addition of this factor elevates the Taiwan 
issue from one of a potentially manageable domestic political issue to primary status 
within the PRC’s modern security paradigm.                     
a. Taiwan and the United States Factor  
United States involvement in the Taiwan situation is not a new 
phenomenon.  Overt United States military involvement dates back to the Korean War 
when the United States Navy’s Seventh Fleet was dispatched to deter PRC aggression 
toward the island.    United States support of Taiwan was then reinforced in December 
1954 upon the signing of a mutual defense pact.  This bi-lateral relationship endured until 
the United States severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and subsequently opened official 
diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, ultimately setting the stage for the modern 
United States dynamic within the PRC-Taiwan stalemate.            
In the current cross-Strait context, a central element is the existence of: 
An American law called the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 (which 
requires) the president to view any Chinese use of force against Taiwan as 
a ‘threat to peace and security’ of the region and to consult with Congress 
on how to react.121   
The TRA is “not a formal defense treaty (and) it does not pledge the United States to a 
specific course of action if hostilities break out with the PRC (however) the TRA 
represents a strong American political commitment to Taiwan.”122     
The practical application of this dynamic was manifest during the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 when “China conducted military exercises and live missile 
firings in the Taiwan Strait as a response to the increasingly pro-independence stance of 
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Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui.”123  In reaction, the United States deployed “two 
aircraft carrier groups into the island’s vicinity…(and ultimately) conveyed its resolve to 
defend Taiwan against aggression from the mainland.”124  The concert of this precedent 
and existential United States legislation regarding Taiwan’s security informs the PRC 
realization that they must develop the capability to discourage United States intervention 
should Taiwan’s re-integration become vital to regime survival.  This dynamic has 
become the defining element of the PRC’s contemporary security calculus.     
The Taiwan issue will continue to define the PRC security context as long 
as the CCP considers it the most exigent political-military threat to regime survival.  The 
CCP also regards the PRC’s sustained economic growth—and by extension SLOC 
defense—as critical.    However, due to Taiwan’s prominence within the PRC’s current 
security context SLOC defense functions as a “comparatively secondary concern.”125  As 
a result, the PRC has undertaken alternative security measures to mitigate the SLOC 
mission while the PRC’s main security focal point remains trained on Taiwan.     
2. SLOC Defense: Defining the Mission  
As was previously outlined, the PRC’s access to overseas oil is vital to both the 
sustainment of economic growth and the perpetuation of CCP rule.   This provides 
rationale for the phenomena that the PRC’s “demand for crude oil doubled between 1995 
and 2005, and will double again in the coming decade or two, as it imports 7.3 million 
barrels of crude daily by 2020.”126  Further amplifying the PRC’s growing appetite for 
energy resources is “a (2010) report from the Paris-based International Energy Agency 
(which) stated that China had become the world’s number-one energy consumer, 
surpassing the United States.”127    Due to this increased reliance on energy imports it is 
estimated that approximately 40 percent of PRC oil imports come via the maritime 
                                                 
123 Pradun,  “From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts: China’s Missile Revolution and PLA Strategy 
Against U.S. Military Intervention,” 7.   
124 Ibid.   
125 Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, 290.   
126 Ibid., 8.   
127 Lin, “The New Silk Road: China’s Energy Strategy in the Greater Middle East,” 3.   
 31
domain.128  Compounding this reality is the PRC’s “‘Malacca Dilemma’ (as) currently 80 
percent of its oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca.”129 
This dynamic has engendered the primal impetus for the PRC’s SLOC defense 
paradigm.  As a result, PRC analysts are touting the importance of developing power 
projection type military capabilities to secure the PRC’s SLOCs.130  However, the reality 
is that SLOC defense exists as a tangential and subordinate mission to that of Taiwan.  
This is due in large part to the fact that the current cross-Strait dynamic is fairly stable,131 
and the PRC’s SLOCs are subject to “the global freedom of navigation provided by the 
U.S. Navy...and it is arguably still in China’s interest to ‘free ride’ on this ‘public good’ 
for the foreseeable future.”132  In light of this favorable international context it is rational 
that the PRC prefers not to invest heavily in military forces dedicated to the mission of 
SLOC defense.  Therefore, the SLOC defense mission is subject to reduced status in the 
PRC’s contemporary security context which forces the PRC to pursue alternative 
methods to achieve sustained energy security.   This alternate “strategy centers on 
establishing Chinese footholds with military or geopolitical influence along the Indian 
Ocean littoral and into the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean—a ‘string of pearls’.”133    
a. SLOC Defense’s Mitigating Strategy: The String of Pearls 
In order to mitigate its reluctance to dedicate significant military assets to 
the SLOC protection mission, the PRC has undertaken multiple endeavors to initiate 
strategic SLOC presence.  This phenomenon is known as the string of pearls and consists 
primarily of a two-pronged strategy consisting of largely non-military SLOC wide 
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transportation infrastructure projects and the nurturing of PRC diplomatic relations.134  
Though “the term is based more on inferences U.S. observers have drawn from Chinese 
activities in the region than on a coherent national strategy codified in Chinese doctrine, 
strategic commentary, or official statements;”135 it is evident that a PRC pattern centered 
on the procurement of energy resources is developing along the SLOCs.  This is due to 
the fact that key components of the string of pearls include:   
The construction of a large port and listening post at the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar on the Arabian Sea...at Hambantota on the southern coast of Sri 
Lanka the Chinese seem to be building the oil-age equivalent of a coaling 
station for their ships, at the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong on the Bay of 
Bengal Chinese companies have been active in developing the container 
port facility (and) in Burma, (where) Beijing is building and upgrading 
commercial and naval bases (and) constructing road, waterway, and 
pipeline links from the Bay of Bengal to China’s Yunnan Province.136 
Given the fact that the PRC’s near-term SLOC access is likely assured due 
to the prevailing geo-political climate, the PRC’s overarching goal in implementing this 
largely non-military based alternative strategy is initiate a forward SLOC presence so as 
to alleviate immediate pressure on the PLA and PLAN.    
Augmenting the maritime-centric string of pearls, the PRC has also 
established and is growing its significant overland energy procurement infrastructure.  
Pursuant to this, in addition to an existential pipeline from Kazakhstan, “in January 2011 
a 300,000 b/d spur pipeline from Siberia to Daqing began delivering crude to China (and) 
China also commenced construction on a pipeline designed to transport crude oil and 
natural gas from Kyuakpya, Burma to Kunming, China.”137  The goal of these endeavors 
is to further mitigate the PRC’s SLOC defense paradigm by “building additional lines to 
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‘bypass’ the Malacca Strait.”138  Concurrently, the PRC has also pursued additional non-
maritime energy access objectives such as using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
to establish a foothold in certain central Asian regions.139  The concert of the PRC’s 
largely non-military string of pearls strategy and regional overland pipeline endeavors as 
an alternate means of mitigating its SLOC defense mission serves as a data point further 
indicative of Taiwan’s pre-eminence within the PRC’s modern security paradigm.            
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has served to outline an enduring behavioral model for PRC use of 
force since 1949.  In this context, the PLA—and the PLAN as its subordinate service—
has historically and continues to be defensively-based and oriented toward the prevalent 
threat to PRC territorial sovereignty.  This chapter has also served to articulate the PRC’s 
contemporary security context, one in which the threat of the United States in a Taiwan 
re-integration conflict functions as the dominant theme.  The confluence of these 
conclusions would logically yield that the modern PLAN is characterized as an 
established defensively-oriented naval force primarily focused on the United States as the 
main adversarial party in a Taiwan conflict.  The next chapter aims to confirm this 
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III. THE MODERN PLAN: TARGET USA  
As the previous chapter argued, the PRC’s contemporary security context is 
principally defined by the Taiwan issue and the United States’ role in such a scenario.  As 
a result, the thrust of the modern PLA has been centered on the development of a force 
capable of reasonably countering United States military forces.  Pursuant to this, the 
PRC’s 
approach to this challenge (has) manifested in a sustained effort to develop 
the capability to attack, at long ranges, (United States) military forces that 
might deploy or operate within the western Pacific (characterized) as ‘anti-
access’ and ‘area denial’ (A2AD) capabilities.140   
Due to the intrinsic value of a robust naval force within this strategy and the precedent of 
United States naval intervention during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, the PLAN has 
enjoyed a marked increase in PRC attention and funds over the last two decades.141   
The A2AD paradigm has engendered the PLA’s recognition of two central 
operational complications with which the PLAN’s modernization must contend.  The first 
is the broader acknowledgement that the: 
U.S. armed forces are the leaders in incorporating advanced technologies 
into military operations and have (historically) applied these operations in 
war (reinforcing that) the principal adversary the PLA will potentially 
confront in an ‘informationalized’ war is the United States.142   
Integral to this broader reality is the second operational problem set in which “Chinese 
analysts and strategists consider aircraft carriers as the center of gravity of the U.S. 
potential for interceding in a Taiwan scenario.”143  As a result, the two dominant themes 
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within the PLAN’s contemporary modernization have been “seeking the initiative within 
the concept of informationalization to counter potential U.S. participation in a western 
Pacific conflict (and) preventing effective (U.S.) carrier operations.”144  These thematic 
strands have come to define the A2AD mission set and subsequently permeate all aspects 
of the modern PLAN.   
This chapter surveys the modern PLAN and identifies how its modernization is 
oriented toward these themes and countering the United States military threat within the 
context of Taiwan’s re-integration.  It is divided into three main sections.  The first 
section surveys the contemporary PLAN’s equipment status to include sub-sections 
devoted to the traditional naval warfare paradigms of surface, subsurface and air warfare.  
The next section is dedicated to the modern PLAN’s personnel establishment.  The final 
section reviews the PLAN’s recent training and operational trends.  The aggregate of this 
approach serves to indicate the predominant influence of the A2AD model and 
countering the United States as an impetus for modern PLAN development.   
A. THE MODERN PLAN: EQUIPMENT AND HARDWARE             
Over the last two decades, in pursuit of a force capable of A2AD operations the 
PLAN has undertaken a force modernization characterized by both foreign acquisition 
(typically from Russia) and advances in organic capability production.  The central 
materiel focus of the PLAN’s wholesale modernization has been “ensuring the capability 
of China’s submarine force to serve as a primary military instrument in the event of a 
security confrontation with the United States over Taiwan’s status.”145  This submarine-
centric development has been augmented by significant upgrades to the PLAN’s anti-ship 
ballistic missile (ASBM) and anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) capabilities, surface force 
air defense, and naval aviation.146  However, despite this marked materiel transformation 
the PLAN remains limited in its development and acquisition of force projection 
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capability.  As a result, the modern PLAN’s materiel acquisitions and deployment 
reinforce its defensively-based focus on countering the United States threat vis-à-vis 
Taiwan.  
1. The Modern PLAN Submarine Force 
As previously indicated, a key theme within the PLAN’s modern archetype is 
developing the ability to counter United States aircraft carriers and it is apparent that the 
PLAN diesel submarine force has been molded to satisfy that mission set.  The PLAN’s 
main instrument to accomplish this mission is its twelve unit Russian-constructed Kilo 
class submarine inventory and the majority of the arsenal’s possession of the SS-N-27B 
Klub-s supersonic ASCM.147  This element is important because the SS-N-27B has been 
attributed with the ability “to defeat the U.S. Aegis air- and missile-defense system that is 
central to the defense of carrier strike groups.”148  Due to their inherent applicability in a 
Taiwan scenario, the acquisition of the Kilos functions as a key data point indicative of 
the PLAN’s primary focus on the A2AD counter-United States mission set.   
Augmenting the Kilo within the PLAN’s modern diesel submarine arsenal are the 
indigenously constructed Song class boats.149  Though less capable than the Kilos, the 
Songs can be outfitted with the indigenous YJ-82 (C-802) ASCM.150  The YJ-82/C-802 
ASCM has proven capable in combat as demonstrated “by Hezbollah fighters wielding 
(the weapon) against Israeli naval vessel INS Hanit on 14 July 2006.”151  Rounding out 
the PLAN’s modern diesel submarine force is the Yuan class submarine.  The Yuan class 
can also hold the YJ-82 ASCM and “may also be fitted with an (air-independent 
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propulsion) AIP system, which enables a diesel submarine to operate for significantly 
longer periods of time without surfacing to recharge its batteries.”152  The capabilities of 
the Song and Yuan offer significant supplemental depth to the Kilo force further 
highlighting the importance and centricity of diesel submarines toward the modern PLAN 
mission paradigm.  
In addition to the diesel submarine force “the PLAN has two active building 
programs to replace its six old nuclear powered submarines, the Xia-class SSBN and five 
Han-class SSNs.”153  This has included the construction of two Shang class SSNs that 
along with the Song and Yuan will ultimately be able to employ the extended range CH-
SS-NX-13 ASCM.154  Concurrently, the PLAN “is also developing a near-continuous at-
sea strategic deterrent with the Jin SSBN program (which will feature) the new JL-2 
submarine launched ballistic missile...capable of reaching the continental United States 
from Chinese littorals.”155  Though in its nascent stages of development, the existence of 
this program is significant because once complete it will mark the initial PLAN capability 
to legitimately threaten the United States strategically.156  As a result, the Jin SSBN 
program is applicable to the PLAN’s modern A2AD mission profile in that “this SLBM 
force (will allow) Beijing to act more confidently in bold undertakings vis-à-vis the 
United States, knowing that its strategic forces are appropriately redundant and more 
secure.”157  
There is an existential argument that the PLAN’s submarine force could also 
function as a legitimate SLOC defense mechanism.  However, the inherent nature of 
submarines limits their utility within the PRC’s SLOC protection mission as “SLOCs are 
best preserved with a visible display of military power and the tactical advantages 
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enjoyed by surface combatants.”158   This observation is accurate and accordingly the 
next section will outline the PLAN’s modern surface force.  Yet, this analysis will yield 
that the architecture of its surface force modernization is more conducive to the counter- 
United States A2AD paradigm which has pervaded the PLAN’s sub-surface force 
modernization.                 
2. The Modern PLAN Surface Force 
The PLAN’s modernization has engendered a robust and capable surface force.  
Consistent within this development is the A2AD-centric “standard of relying on ASCMs 
as PLAN warships’ main armament.”159 Complementing this trend are marked 
improvements to the surface force area-air defense (AAD) capabilities.160  The signature 
foreign acquisitions and recent indigenous production within these two strands of surface 
force development indicate that Taiwan’s A2AD counter-U.S. element also drives the 
materiel focus of the PLAN’s modern surface fleet.   
Central to this paradigm is the PLAN’s signature surface combatant: the 
Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG).  The PLAN acquired four of these 
warships from Russia in the period between 1999 and 2006.161  A key characteristic of 
the Sovremenny is that “the Soviet Union designed the ship in the early 1970’s 
specifically to counter U.S. carriers and escorts equipped with high-tech air defenses.”162  
As a result, the PLAN Sovremennys “each (carry) eight SS-N-22 ‘Sunburn’ sea-
skimming anti-ship missiles...designed specifically to penetrate the defenses of U.S. 
Navy Aegis destroyers and aircraft carrier battle groups.”163  The Sovremenny’s ASCM 
armament is significant because “to date, the U.S. Navy has been unable to develop 
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effective countermeasures against the Sunburn.”164  The PLAN’s emphasis on the 
Sovremenny functions as the core data point indicative of surface force focus on 
countering the United States in a conflict over Taiwan.   
Augmenting the PLAN’s Sovremenny fleet are the indigenously produced 
Luzhou-class and Luyang II- class DDGs.165  Touted as its signature capability, the 
Luzhou possesses “a formidable anti-air warfare (AAW) system (that) is built around the 
Russian SA-N-20 Rif-M missile, the naval version of the S-300 (and offers) an 81-nm 
range.”166  Additionally, the Luzhou is configured “for operations in a modern 
electromagnetic environment (as) the ship is equipped with chaff/decoy launchers and 
has active electronic countermeasures (ECM) capability.”167  The Luyang II also boasts 
an advanced air-defense capability as it is “fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 long-range 
surface to air missile.”168  This robust system was originally designed to “emulate the 
U.S. Patriot system (and) has a range of 54-nm.”169  The advent of these surface units 
reinforces the PLAN’s materiel commitment to the A2AD model in that they compensate 
for the Sovremennys’ inherent “weaknesses in AAW”170 and offer “improving ECM and 
information warfare (IW) capabilities further (suggesting) a plan to engage and disrupt 
U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups in a Taiwan conflict.”171      
Though the modern PLAN’s surface combatant architecture is fundamentally 
influenced by the counter-United States A2AD paradigm, its capabilities could 
potentially extend to a SLOC defense mission as well.  However, the paucity of a crucial 
logistic element within the PLAN surface force precludes legitimate execution of the 
latter.  Due to the sheer distances inherent in the SLOC defense mission, successful 
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execution necessitates use of replenishment at sea (RAS) vessels that carry “a full variety 
of fuel, food, and ammunition in one hull with multi-highline RAS stations on each  
side.”172  Currently, the PLAN only possesses three ships capable of this mission,173 and 
among these the PLAN “has added just two...the Fuchi class, since 2000.”174  As a result, 
PLAN A2AD-centric surface combatant acquisition has outpaced that of its RAS-capable 
counterparts serving as an additional data point that PLAN focus remains on Taiwan as 
logistic consideration for maintaining a robust the SLOC defense mission capability has 
not progressed past nascent stages.   
A modicum of the PLAN’s modernization “has been directed at modernizing the 
amphibious force, but not at significantly expanding its capacity: the PLAN is still 
limited to transporting approximately one mechanized division of fully equipped 
troops.”175  This phenomenon is likely due to the fact that amphibious operations are not 
integral to the counter-United States A2AD paradigm.  Furthermore, PLAN leadership 
may appreciate that bolstering an amphibious lift capability vis-à-vis Taiwan would 
prove a fruitless endeavor considering Taiwan’s lack of assault-ready shoreline.176  
Regardless, the amphibious element of the PLAN’s surface modernization has been 
limited to the domestic production of the “Yuzhao-class vessel (which is) similar in 
design, size, and apparent capability to a U.S. San Antonio-class LPD.”177  Though a 
marked modernization to the PLAN amphibious fleet, the ship’s addition does not 
significantly impact the PLAN’s amphibious lift capability nor enhance its A2AD 
functionality.  This dynamic has engendered speculative commentary as to the Yuzhao’s 
utility in an extra-Taiwan capacity.  This is certainly plausible; especially within the 
context of improving the PLAN’s humanitarian assistance-disaster relief (HADR) 
capability as the Yuzhao “offers a platform for humanitarian operations similar to the 
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2004 post-tsunami...relief efforts that the United States has been able to conduct 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”178   However, as it pertains to the PLAN’s extra-
Taiwan mission of SLOC defense the utility of the Yuzhao within that paradigm is fairly 
limited and thus not a significant impetus for its construction.   
3. The Modern PLAN Air Forces      
As it pertains to the PLAN’s organizational construct the PLAN Air Force 
(PLANAF) functions as the organic air component of the PLAN and is separate from the 
PLA Air Force.  Central to the modern PLANAF is its fixed wing fighter force.  The 
cornerstone of this modern air battery is the Su-30 MK2.  The Su-30 MK2 features “both 
an extended range and maritime radar systems (allowing) the MK2 to strike enemy ships 
at long distances while still maintaining a robust air-to-air capability.”179  These elements 
in conjunction with the fact that the Su-30 MK2 was initially designed to counter United 
States fighter aircraft brands the aircraft a particularly applicable platform within the 
PLAN’s counter-United States A2AD paradigm.180  In keeping with this theme, the 
PLAN also utilizes the indigenous, but more limited J-8 fighter.  The J-8 has a limited 
precedent within the counter-United States A2AD mission in that it was “the aircraft that 
collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft in 2001.”181  The 
PLANAF/PLAAF have also been developing a new strike-fighter known as the J-20 
engendering speculation that “based on the aircraft’s size and design...it might be 
intended as a land-based strike aircraft for attacking ships at sea.”182 Additionally, there is 
some evidence that the PLANAF is developing a cadre of carrier-based aircraft as the  
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PRC has reportedly “been in negotiations with Russia to purchase up to 50 Russian-made 
carrier capable Su-33 fighter aircraft and may be developing indigenous carrier-capable 
fighters.”183   
The PLAN’s potential acquisition of aircraft carriers functions as the most 
contentious issue regarding the future direction of the force.  This is because an aircraft 
carrier is perceived to be an “(instrument) of force projection, (although) Chinese military 
and government representatives have stated aircraft carriers are necessary for protecting 
China’s maritime territorial integrity.”184  The PLAN’s pursuit of aircraft carriers has 
fallen into its similar model of acquisition for other naval platforms—a hybrid of foreign 
purchase and domestic development.  Currently, the PLAN’s only carrier hull resides at 
Dalian shipyard and is that of a renovated Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier that was 
acquired in 1998.185  Recent press reporting indicates that this renovation may be 
reaching a culmination point as the carrier reportedly conducted initial limited sea trials 
in August 2011.186  This in concert with the pre-natal development of the PLAN’s carrier-
based aircraft force yields consensus that this carrier will likely be used in a development 
instead of operational capacity.187  This dynamic is reinforced by “press statements by 
China’s military and defense-industrial establishment (indicating) that research and 
development for (domestic) carrier construction is underway.”188  The aggregate of these 
developments indicates that the PLAN’s aircraft carrier program is in its extreme infancy.   
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However, this does not restrain proliferation of speculation that the program is 
“probably the most commonly cited example of China’s desire to expand its naval power 
beyond Chinese coastal waters.”189  
This phenomenon stems largely from analytical postulations that maintain PLAN 
“carrier battle groups will be unnecessary in a Taiwan Strait conflict (because) PLA 
warplanes can range over the island and adjacent waters from airfields on the 
mainland.”190  The carrier power projection argument is further bolstered by claims that 
the PLAN requires “a carrier to provide air cover far out to sea...for the SLOC protection 
mission in the Indian Ocean.”191  These analytical conclusions are flawed for multiple 
reasons.  Regarding carriers vis-à-vis Taiwan, a carrier force could be used effectively in 
a dual role that would simultaneously hasten Taiwan’s capitulation and reinforce the 
PLAN A2AD mission.  In threatening Taiwan proper, “a PLAN carrier force operating 
east of Taiwan could attack that island’s air defense forces on two fronts if the PLA were 
able to coordinate carrier-based attacks with shore-based attacks from the mainland.”192  
Within Taiwan’s A2AD paradigm, a carrier force would further enable the PLAN’s 
deterrent capacity in that it would possess an ability to conduct “a major fleet engagement 
in the Pacific against U.S. forces en route to relieve the island.”193  A carrier force would 
be of limited use regarding PRC SLOC defense in that aircraft carriers do not provide the 
necessary escort-protection capabilities that surface combatants afford.194  Additionally, 
effective deployment of a carrier force within the PRC SLOC defense paradigm would 
require a substantial upgrade to the PLAN’s menial afloat logistic force.  If the PLAN’s 
nascent carrier program is being considered for any extra-Taiwan mission set it is likely 
that of a HADR-type as “the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami appears to have been a turning 
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point in the Chinese leadership’s support for an aircraft carrier.”195 The bottom line is that 
at this point the PLAN’s carrier program does not represent a marked departure from the 
PLAN’s materiel modernization focus on the counter-United States A2AD mission.   
Though technically not a PLANAF asset, the PLA “is developing an anti-ship 
ballistic missile (ASBM)...known as the DF-21D...intended to provide the PLA the 
capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific 
Ocean.”196  Reportedly, the DF-21D will have “the capability to perform a mid-course 
ballistic correction maneuver to update the target’s location and then guide a 
Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) to the target (with) munitions designed to attack 
aircraft carrier sub-systems.”197  This ASBM development is significant because “the 
U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles 
capable of hitting moving ships at sea.”198  Thus, if the DF-21D proves to be an effective 
weapon it could represent a fundamental paradigm shift within the PLAN’s A2AD 
dynamic in that its ability to neutralize United States carrier strike groups ostensibly 
eliminates the United States’ key deterrent regarding the PRC’s forcible re-integration of 
Taiwan.   As a result, the advent of the DF-21D program arguably functions as the most 
prescient data point indicating that the PLAN’s—and broader PLA’s—primary impetus 
for materiel modernization is countering United States intervention in a Taiwan conflict. 
B. THE MODERN PLAN PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT             
In a similar vein as its recent hardware upgrades, the architecture of the PLAN’s 
modern personnel corps also reflects the force’s primary counter-United States A2AD 
focus.  This is primarily due to recent PLAN efforts aimed at accessing and retaining a 
personnel corps with the necessary technical skills to support modernization efforts 
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aimed at countering the technologically superior United States military.  Additionally, the 
CCP assures PLAN loyalty by perpetuating a personnel system “aimed at ensuring 
constant CCP presence throughout the Navy chain of command.”199  These dynamics 
indicate the PLAN personnel establishment’s “continued twin emphasis on ideological 
reliability and technical competence.”200  These themes are propagated throughout the 
spectrum of the contemporary PLAN personnel establishment reinforcing Taiwan’s 
counter-United States paradigm as the core impetus for its broader modernization.     
1. The Enlisted Force  
The PLAN’s personnel modernization has resulted in a fundamental re-structuring 
of its enlisted force.  Central to this was the 1999 revision of the Military Service Law, 
which shifted obligated conscripted service to two years and increased the service length 
of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to 20 years.201  This revision was largely in 
response to increased retention difficulties as a result of the PRC’s burgeoning 
economy.202  As a result, significant personnel efforts have been trained upon retaining a 
technically proficient NCO corps.203  Pursuant to this, endeavors include re-alignment of 
the enlisted rank structure, accentuated NCO technical education, and the implementation 
of various pay incentives.204  Concurrently, NCO selection has become increasingly 
competitive as applicants must “be recommended, evaluated and approved by their unit 
(and are subject to) a series of academic and physical tests.”205  The initial yield of these 
efforts has been fruitful, for “since 1999, the PLAN has decreased the number of 
conscripts and increased the number of NCOs to approximately 40 percent of all PLAN 
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personnel.”206  The PLAN’s focus on NCO development has been central to its enlisted 
force re-structuring ultimately reflecting the centrality of technical expertise proliferation 
to the PLAN personnel establishment.   
The influence of the CCP is also integral to the modern PLAN enlisted force as 
CCP representation is present at every denomination level of personnel.  For example:  
Onboard ship...each department, division, and even work center includes a 
party committee or at least a representative.  Although not necessarily a 
trained CCP commissar, this individual is usually a member of the CCP 
and is expected to function as its representative during the ship’s daily 
work...the CCP representative...will report  up the party chain of command 
to the ship’s senior commissar, who usually holds the same rank as the 
ship’s commanding officer.207   
This construct allows for comprehensive CCP permeation throughout the PLAN enlisted 
cadre reinforcing the influence of the party on all aspects of the PLAN.  This element 
combined with the implementation of a fundamental personnel re-alignment strategy 
dedicated to bolstering broad technical proficiency is producing an enlisted force 
conducive to a PLAN modernization model predicated on the Taiwan problem set and 
opposing a technologically advanced United States force.   
2. The Officer Corps 
The PLAN officer corps also personifies the dominant thematic strands of the 
PLAN personnel establishment in that “PLAN officers are expected to lead and to 
demonstrate operational skill and professional, political and technical knowledge in a 
complex, modern environment.”208  Pursuant to this, the PLAN has undertaken a two-
pronged approach to the shaping of its modern officer corps.  The first prong concentrates 
on the reductionist method of downsizing.209 The second prong concentrates on the 
acquisition and continuum of education for this trimmer, more elite cadre of officers.  As 
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a result, the PLAN has stepped up the technical curriculums at its nine naval academies—
the traditional commissioning source for PLAN officers.210  Augmenting this effort is the 
PLA’s implementation of: 
The National Defense Student program (through which the PLAN) is 
pursuing especially ambitious Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)-
type programs by establishing ‘science and technology cooperative ties’ 
with more than one hundred colleges in twenty provinces and 
municipalities.211 
In order to perpetuate a technically-savvy officer corps the PLAN has built on this initial 
accession educational paradigm by formalizing a career long continuum of education that 
is required for promotion comprised of expected mid-career attendance at “the Naval 
Command School in Nanjing which concentrates on courses in technical subjects (and 
senior officer attendance at) the National Defense University (NDU) in Beijing.”212   
In addition to the PLAN’s aforementioned political commissar system,213 the CCP 
also controls all elements of PLAN officer personnel management.214  This dynamic in 
concert with its refined officer accession and education strategy enables the modern 
PLAN’s goal of producing “professionally qualified naval officers who are dedicated to 
China and to its Communist Party rulers.”215  This construct complements the PLAN’s 
enlisted cadre further bolstering a comprehensive personnel establishment that is both 
technically proficient and politically loyal—one custom-built to support broad 
modernization efforts aimed at a Taiwan contingency complicated by United States 
intervention.             
                                                 
210 Office of Naval Intelligence, “The People’s Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” 32.  Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 122.     
211 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 122–123.   
212 Ibid., 128–129.   
213 Ibid., 61.   
214 Ibid., 140–141.   
215 Ibid., 137.   
 49
C. THE MODERN PLAN’S TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 
1. PLAN Training  
PLAN training is primarily promulgated by the annual “Outline of Military 
Training and Evaluation (OMTE) issued by the PLA General Staff Department’s Military 
Training and Service Arms Department in Beijing.”216  Recent iterations of the OMTE 
have indicated increased focus on technical training as “the 2009 OMTE 
(emphasized)...training in electromagnetic and joint operating environments and 
integrating new, advanced technologies into the force structure.”217  This trend supports 
the broader PLAN focus on the Taiwan A2AD paradigm in that it manifests “vital lessons 
learned from its observations of recent U.S. operations and a conviction that the United 
States is the opponent it is most likely to face in the near future.”218  A recent OMTE also 
reflects a recurring trend of increasing extra-Taiwan PLAN focus on the HADR paradigm 
in that it promulgates a training syllabus in which “military operations other than war 
(MOOTW) are prominently featured.”219  
Though the OMTE offers evidence as to the PLAN’s intended training focus, it is 
much harder to discern a trend line in its practical application as the PLAN’s exercise 
curriculum is largely veiled by pervasive secrecy.220  However, available evidence 
indicates that “the PLAN has maintained a steady program of exercises during the past 
decade (that) has grown steadily in both frequency and complexity.”221  This trend line 
has also yielded evidence of surface and subsurface ASCM-based opposed force training 
and exercises set in advanced electromagnetic conditions.222  The PLAN has also 
increased its participation in bi-lateral and multinational exercises in recent years its most 
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significant of these is its repeated engagement with Russian forces in the bi-lateral 
PEACE MISSION exercises in 2005, 2007 and 2009.223 The relative frequency of these 
bi-lateral exercises has engendered speculation that “the Russians are...likely...to offer to 
resupply missiles and spare parts for the key Russian weapon systems that China would 
employ in combat with Taiwan and the United States.”224 The concert of the PLAN’s 
observed domestic exercise trends and its established bi-lateral engagements with Russia 
suggests that the Taiwan counter-United States A2AD paradigm functions as the main 
influence on the PLAN training program.  
2. PLAN Operations 
In addition to these observed training trends, the PLAN’s recent operations have 
been dominated by submarine activity in that “when compared to the historical levels of 
the last two decades, the number of submarine patrols over the last few years has more 
than tripled.”225  This operational trend is consistent with PLAN materiel focus on 
submarine development.  One significant example within this phenomenon was “in 2004 
(when) a Han-class submarine apparently cruised all the way to Guam, circumnavigated 
the island...and surfaced on its return voyage to China.”226  Exacerbating this precedent 
was “the ‘Song’ incident near Okinawa on 26 October 2006, when a Chinese diesel 
submarine reportedly penetrated the protective screen of the U.S. Navy’s Kitty Hawk 
carrier battle group.”227  The concert of these incidents has stimulated conjecture that 
“Beijing may be using these encounters to send a signal to Washington, cautioning it 
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against intervening in a Taiwan scenario.”228  The confluence of PLAN emphasis on 
counter-United States submarine materiel development and an increased submarine 
operational tempo in which probing United States forces is a characteristic indicates the 
significance of opposing United States intervention in a Taiwan scenario as a prime 
impetus for the modern PLANs operational model.   
The element of modern PLAN operations that best supports a shift toward the 
paradigm of PRC SLOC defense is its sustained counter-piracy deployments to the Gulf 
of Aden since 2009.  These deployments demonstrate the PLAN’s ability to conduct 
limited power-projection type maritime operations as “each (task group is) composed of 
two destroyers or frigates and an underway replenishment ship (and) by all accounts, the 
ships have performed well during their deployments.”229  However, categorizing these 
successive deployments as the PLAN’s nascent attempt at SLOC defense is flawed.  
Rather, these deployments function as an additional data point indicative of the PLAN’s 
embryonic extra-Taiwan focus on the MOOTW mission set which reinforces the now 
prevalent PRC foreign policy paradigms of “‘peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious 
world’.”230        
The PLAN’s sustained participation in the counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of 
Aden functions as a particularly useful diplomatic vehicle through which the PRC can 
propagate its global “‘charm offensive’.”231  The counter-piracy mission is conducive to 
this dynamic in that piracy does not function as a globally de-stabilizing phenomenon and 
it is not polarizing because “pirates are hostes humani generis: nobody likes them and 
their actions have made them enemies to everyone; (as a result) counter piracy...is a great 
common enemy and a good chance for the forgotten art of maritime diplomacy.”232  
Pursuant to this, the PLAN “has gradually expanded (its) exposure to and connection 
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with the U.S. Combined Task Force 151 (and) has apparently agreed to take up a 
leadership position in the Shared Awareness and De-confliction-the European Union 
counter-piracy coalition.”233  Therefore, the PLAN’s participation in the relatively benign 
international counter-piracy mission functions more as an international political lever 
than as a precursor to a broader PLAN trend toward the SLOC defense paradigm.   
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter’s survey of the modern PLAN’s materiel, personnel, training and 
operational trends yields that its current focus is trained upon Taiwan and that mission’s 
inherent United States counter- interventionist A2AD model.  Pursuant to this, the recent 
modernization trends of the PLAN are narrowly concentrated upon rapid technological 
advancement and development of capabilities to sufficiently counter or deter intervening 
United States Navy carrier strike groups.  Despite the predominance of this dynamic, 
there is some limited evidence of extra-Taiwan mission influence within the modern 
PLAN.  However, this limited evidence indicates nascent movement toward the 
development of PRC foreign policy-enhancing MOOTW capabilities rather than a 
concentration on PRC SLOC protection and defense.  It must be re-iterated at this 
juncture that any evidence indicative of extra-Taiwan influence on the PLAN is imperfect 
and that the overwhelming majority of evidence indicates that the PLAN’s modernization 
trajectory is oriented toward Taiwan.    
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The core charge of this thesis was to determine the extent of the balance between 
the PRC’s military problem sets of Taiwan and SLOC protection as impetus for the 
PLAN’s modern mission paradigm.  In order to achieve this end, this thesis included a 
brief analysis of the PLA—and the PLAN as its subordinate service—since 1949 in order 
to identify characteristic trends and themes, a survey of the contemporary PRC security 
context so as to establish the hierarchy of Taiwan versus SLOC defense in that construct, 
and a comprehensive examination of the PLAN’s modernization.  These analyses have 
yielded that the PLAN functions as a complementary force within the defensively 
oriented PLA, the potential interventionism of the United States within a Taiwan conflict 
functions as the most exigent politico-military threat within the contemporary PRC 
security context, and the main focus for the PLAN’s modernization is deterring and 
countering the United States in a Taiwan re-integration scenario.  As a result, it is this 
thesis’ conclusion that Taiwan functions as the prime impetus for the PLAN’s modern 
mission paradigm.  However, there are existential data points which indicate nascent 
development of extra-Taiwan PLAN mission sets.  These embryonic indications do not 
represent a PLAN paradigm shift toward power-projection endeavors such as SLOC 
defense; but rather mark a movement toward increased military diplomacy that is in 
keeping with the PRC’s prevailing security rubric of national defense.  
A. SLOC DEFENSE, NOT A MILITARY ISSUE 
This thesis’ analysis has reinforced the premise that, insofar as it pertains to the 
PLAN, the PRC’s “priority for SLOC defense, especially concern for the security of its 
overseas energy supplies, does not play a major role in its national security policy 
process.”234  This is despite the phenomenon that some “Chinese navalists have become 
avid students of the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (who) pointed to the 
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importance of protecting SLOCs to markets abroad.”235  However, the existential fact 
remains that the PRC “government has not officially embraced such (Mahanian) 
views.”236  Rather, as this thesis has discussed, the PRC has pursued alternate, largely 
non-military methods to mitigate the SLOC defense paradigm.  As a result, the PLAN 
“has no (SLOC-wide) network of facilities and bases to maintain and repair its ships.”237  
Nowhere is this more evident than “in the case of (the Pakistani string of pearls port of) 
Gwadar, as the Port of Singapore Authority prepares to run the facility for decades to 
come.”238  Furthermore, this thesis has argued that PLAN materiel acquisitions, 
operations and training models do not indicate even a modest inclination toward the 
SLOC defense mission.  SLOC defense will maintain its ancillary status within the PLAN 
mission profile until the PLAN demonstrates a marked paradigm shift that consists of 
three key criteria: 1) the hard acquisition of multiple auxiliary replenishment vessels,  
2) the implementation and execution of an observed SLOC defense training syllabus and 
subsequent operational deployments, and 3) the distinct establishment of SLOC-wide 
naval outposts.    
B. THE OUTLIERS: AMPHIBS, CARRIERS AND PIRATES 
This thesis has identified three key elements of the modern PLAN that serve as 
potential data points indicative of a PLAN mission paradigm shift to SLOC defense.  
These include the PLAN’s acquisition of the Yuzhao-class amphibious ship, marked 
advances in its carrier development program and the sustained counter-piracy 
deployments to the Gulf of Aden.  This thesis has outlined why the connection of these 
elements to SLOC defense-related suppositions are inaccurate.  However, there is a 
common thread among these three elements that points to an emergent extra-Taiwan 
PLAN mission set predicated on the PRC’s “two major foreign policy concepts (known 
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as) ‘peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious world.’”239  These themes have crept into 
PRC defense parlance as the 2010 white paper outlines the “interests of national 
development (and) maintaining world peace and stability (as core) goals and tasks of 
China’s national defense in the new era.”240   
This thesis has articulated and identified speculation that potential impetus for the 
acquisition of the Yuzhao-class amphibious ship and development of a carrier program 
stems from the PLAN’s desire to bolster its organic MOOTW capabilities—specifically 
in the realm of HADR.241  This speculation is supported by the fact that “it is well known 
that China was embarrassed in the aftermath of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
when the PLAN was obliged by a lack of suitable platforms to stand on the sidelines as 
several other countries...deployed naval forces to provide humanitarian relief.”242  In 
reaction to this, “in November 2007 Beijing established the National Committee for 
International Humanitarian Law for the purpose of enhancing the PLA’s knowledge and 
capabilities to conduct international humanitarian operations.”243  This data point lends 
credence to postulations that extra-Taiwan MOOTW-type missions are an impetus behind 
the PLAN’s recent amphibious ship and carrier developments.  Though certainly in its 
nascent stages, this is certainly a plausible supposition as this thesis has indicated that the 
Yuzhao-class amphibious ship and carrier program’s utility within the SLOC-defense 
paradigm is limited.   
The PLAN’s sustained counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden functions in 
the similar vein as it reflects what many consider “Beijing’s desire to be seen as a 
responsible stakeholder in ensuring maritime security (and) it enhances China’s image as 
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a responsible member of the global community.”244   This thesis has indicated that the 
PLAN’s participation in the multi-national counter-piracy effort fits this mold as counter 
piracy functions as a benign mission through which to propagate diplomacy.245  Pursuant 
to this, within the counter-piracy framework the PRC has engaged in “cooperation with 
other world navies...especially those of the developed world (in an apparent attempt to) 
effectively dispel the ‘China Threat theory’.”246  The confluence of this dynamic and the 
PLAN’s modern amphibious and carrier programs indicates the nascent influence of a 
MOOTW-centric extra-Taiwan mission set on the PLAN’s modernization efforts.   
C. TAIWAN...FOR NOW       
This thesis has re-affirmed that certain extra-Taiwan elements of “naval and 
energy policy vectors are developing within the context of China’s peaceful development 
strategy, and more broadly in a global strategic environment at least partly conditioned by 
China’s ‘new diplomacy’.”247  Though this may be the case, this thesis maintains that the 
PLAN’s immediate focus is trained on Taiwan and by extension the United States.  This 
thesis echoes Bernard D. Cole’s observation that the PRC “evinces no evidence of 
pursuing a global, Wilhelmine navy, but rather building a twenty-first century navy 
capable of achieving national security objectives.”248  In the current setting, Taiwan 
functions as the most exigent threat to PRC national security and accordingly the core 
impetus for the PLAN’s modernization.  It is also apparent that the SLOC defense 
mission set does not play a significant role in shaping the modern PLAN.  However, 
evidence of other nascent, MOOTW-related extra-Taiwan strands indicates that the 
PLAN’s modern mission paradigm is fundamentally pliable.                               
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